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Architects' and Engineers' Third Party
Negligence Liability-The Fall of the House
of Privity*
BACKDROP To LIABILITY
Almost 5,000 years ago, under the ancient Babylonian Code of Ham-
murabi, the forerunner of the Roman lex talonis was in vogue. Justice
for builders and designers was swift and sure. As a result of the col-
lapse of a building, if a child died, the son of the builder was killed in
return; if an arm was lost by a third person, the builder's arm was re-
moved; if a death occurred the builder himself was put to death.1
The passing of centuries brought a more dignified and less stringent
attitude toward punishment, until under early English law, it became
necessary for a contractual relationship to exist between the architect and
the owner in order for liability to be incurred by the architect. Today,
we have risen from the launching pad of negligence and are again ap-
proaching the orbit of the strict liability of Hammurabi, not with re-
taliatory punishment, but rather with an economic penalty, justification
for which is usually made on the basis of the doctrine of spreading the
risk.
THE ROLE Or THE ARCHITECT AND ENGINEER
An architect is one who plans and designs buildings and who usually
supervises their erection. Virtually all jurisdictions have licensing stat-
utes which require that persons who hold themselves out to be profes-
sional architects meet certain standards of competence by fulfilling spe-
cific requisites prior to the passing of an examination. The engineers with
whom we are concerned here are those engineers who engage in activi-
ties similar to architects, and hence the terms architect and engineer will
be used interchangeably.
In examining the legal status of an architect, we find that he wears a
coat of many colors. Because of his contract with an owner, we find a
principal-agent relationship in existence.2  With the exception of the
setting out of specific goals that the building program must meet, the
owner exerts virtually no control over the architect in the execution of
plans and specifications; the architect is thus ordinarily thought of as an
*The author, a student at the Western Reserve School of Law, is also a practicing
architect in Cleveland, Ohio.
1. 2 ENCYCLOPAEDiA BmTTANIcA 862, 864 (1958).
2. 3 AM. JUR. Architects § 5 (1936). 6 C.J.S. Architects § 7 (1937).
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independent contractor with respect to the preparation of these docu-
ments.
3
In the supervision of the construction, however, he is an agent of the
owner, with certain limitations. Some of these may be provided by con-
tract and some may be provided by the common law. A supervising
architect may not substitute a sub-contractor, for example, nor does he
have authority over the employment or discharge of workmen.4 He may,
however, direct the manner of work, reject unfit materials, and determine
what brands of materials shall be used where the specifications are am-
biguous. 5 If the architect should exceed the scope of his authority, his
acts may be ratified by his employer as in other cases of agency.6
Because of the usual contractual provision that the architect shall act
as an arbitrator in disputes between the contractor and the owner, the
architect under those conditions assumes a quasi-judicial capacity.7 Be-
cause of this capacity when acting as an arbitrator, his immunity has been
corroborated in many cases.8 A number of English cases at the turn of
the century followed the general rule that the architect or engineer is the
agent and representative of the building owner.9 Later cases, however,
recognized that the architect and the engineer have both a judicial and a
ministerial function. The position was then taken that an architect in
the role of an arbitrator or quasi-arbitrator is only liable when fraudulent
intention is proved, as distinct from negligence alone.' 0 Modern courts
have held that the architect is in a position where his role as the owner's
agent is not adequate to describe the authority with which he is vested."
It is apparent that there are many areas in the course of carrying on
a building operation wherein the architect or the engineer is neither
agent nor independent contractor nor quasi-arbitrator, but part of each.
Courts over the years have had a great deal of difficulty in drawing a fine
line of distinction between these various roles. The problem becomes





7. 3 AM. JuR. Architects § 19 (1936).
8. Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 1227 (1955).
9. 103 LT. 168 (1897).
10. See Stevenson v. Watson, 40 L.T.R. (N.S.) 485 (1879); 71 SOL. J. 745
(1927); 71 SOL. J. 935 (1927).
11. Witherspoon, When is an Architect Liable, 31 N.D.L. Rav. 54 (1955).
12. Banks, Damages for Breach of Contracts of Service, 10 INDus. L. REv. 97




Modern tort law concerning liability to third persons not parties to a
contract finds its roots in Winterbottom v. Wright.'3 The rule of that
case was held for many years to mean that there was no liability of a
contracting party to one with whom he was not in privity. A gradual
erosion of that rule began to take place shortly after its inception. Ex-
ceptions where liability was found included the seller of chattels who
knew that the chattel was dangerous for its intended use, and also in-
stances where the chattel was of a type inherently dangerous to human
safety.14 The famous MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.' 5 case put the
quietus on the Winterbottom rule, at least insofar as chattels were con-
cerned. It was held, in effect, that there was a responsibility on the part
of the manufacturer of chattels to the ultimate consumer which rested
not upon the contract, but upon the relation arising from the purchase
and the foreseeability of harm if proper care in the manufacture were not
used.
The present day tendency is to carry the liability of the manufacturer
of chattels into the area of strict liability and make him, in effect, a
guarantor of his products even though he exercises all reasonable care in
their manufacture. All indications are that this extension of liability to
third persons will continue insofar as chattels are concerned.' 6
While the liability of other contractors to third parties has not ad-
vanced either as rapidly or as extensively as that of suppliers of chattels,
the forces which have held the idea of privity seem to be diminishing
gradually under the counterattack of social improvement. For contracts
other thah in the building industry, many courts have held that where
there is misperformance of the contract, those who furnish labor or ser-
vices have an obligation of reasonable care for the benefit of third per-
sons who might be endangered as a result of the misperformance. 1
Liability of the building contractor with respect to third persons has
been difficult to fix in past years. Many recent cases, however, have
made the distinction between buildings and chattels appear rather
flimsy.' 8 Thus having extended liability to third persons first in the field
of suppliers of chattels, next in the field of other contractors, then in the
13. 10 Mees & W. 109 (1842).
14. Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 Fed. 865 (8th Cir. 1903); Lewis
v. Terry, 111 Cal. 39, 43 Pac. 398 (1896); Schubert v. J.R. Clark Co., 49 Minn.
331, 51 N.W. 1103 (1892).
15. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
16. PRossm, TORTS 507 (2d ed. 1955).
17. Id. at 514.
18. Id. at 518
19591
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
field of some professionals, and finally in the field of building contractors,
the next logical step is being taken in the field of architects and engineers.
LIABILITY AND RIPOSTE
Because an architect's relationship with a construction operation is
born out of a contract it is quite natural to find that his liability for
negligence has grown out of the same contract. On that basis it is neces-
sary to examine the architect's duties resulting from his agreement with
the owner to design a building and to supervise the construction, when
the latter is required.
As in other professions, the architect has a duty to meet professional
standards of conduct. He implies that he possesses the skill and ability,
including taste, sufficient to enable him to perform the required services
reasonably well, and that he will exercise his skill, ability, judgement and
taste reasonably and without neglect.19 The architect has a duty to pro-
vide for reasonable strength of the structure, proper materials, character
of the construction, and he must keep abreast of the improvements in the
industry.20 The owner, as against the architect, may rely upon the suffi-
ciency of the construction of the building when it is certified by the
architect to have been completed in accordance with the plans.
An architect's duty to direct and inspect construction work carries
with it the duty to condemn work which he considers unfit.2 ' He does
not, however, in the absence of a special agreement, imply or guarantee
a perfect plan or completely satisfactory results. He is liable only for
failure to exercise reasonable care and skill.22 There is no implied prom-
ise that miscalculations may not occur and while the architect implies
the use of ordinary skill, he is not an insurer of the accuracy and perfec-
tion of his work. He does not profess that his plans will be absolutely
perfect. Neither does his duty extend to compliance with statutory regu-
lations for the protection of workmen, although the architect himself is
charged with knowledge of the statutory regulations and restrictions gov-
erning the erection and use of the building.23
Even the owner's approval of the architect's plans before they were
used in the construction has been held not to excuse the architect from
the exercise of ordinary and reasonable care in the designing and formu-
19. 3 Am. JUR. Architects § 7 (1936).
20. Ibid.
21. 6 CJ.S. Architects § 17 (1937).
22. 3 AM. JuR. Architects § 7 (1936).
23. 6 C.J.S. Architects § 17 (1937).
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lating of his plans.24 Neither does the failure of the contractor to check
the plans before using them excuse the architect from the consequences
of an error in the plans.25
Although the architects duties are spoken of in .broad&terms, they are
in reality detailed and varied in their scope. An architect may design
not only the exterior of a building but the structural members, the heat-
ing, ventilating, air-conditioning, electrical equipment, and general me-
chanical design as well; in addition, he may assist in the letting of the
building contracts; he may supervise the construction; he may issue cer-
tificates of payment, including a final certificate declaring the building
complete according to the plans and specifications. He thus becomes in-
volved in relationships with many and various people in such a manner
that it is virtually impossible for him not to violate some measure of an
architect's duties, depending upon his interpretation of the word "rea-
sonable." It is probable that because of this tremendously broad scope
of contact resulting from the architect's original contract, there has been
very little attempt until recently to extend the liability of the architect
beyond the parties privy to that contract.
PRviTY OF CONTRACt
Historically, of course, privity of contract was required before a breach
of the architect's duty would create liability to anyone. Even though an
architect is liable to the owner for damages resulting from the architect's
negligence, he is not liable where the owner deals with the contractor in-
dependently.26 In the absence of collusion or fraud, there are many cases
that have held that a third party not privy to the contract cannot rely
upon the contractor's negligent errors or omissions causing damage, in
order to hold a party to the contract liable.2 7  Cases involving property
owners, contractors, and architects, and concerning the issuance of certifi-
cates of payment by the architect where these certificates were either
negligently or improperly issued to someone's damage, indicate that where
the architect is not immune as a quasi-arbitrator, he is liable only to the
owner.28  The classic case of Derry v. Peek29 has been used for many
years to show that where there is no fraud, contracting parties are not
liable to third persons who are not privy to the contract. The cases are
24. Allied Enterprises, Inc. v. Brooks, 93 S.E.2d 392 (Ga. 1956); Annot., 25
A.L.R.2d 1088 (1955).
25. Ibid.
26. 3 OHIo JuR. Architects § 3 (1922); 6 C.J.S. Architects 5 19 (1937).
27. PRossER, TORTs 514 (2d ed. 1955); Annot., 34 A.LR. 67 (1925).
28. Annot., 43 A.LR.2d 1227 (1955).
29. 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
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legion that have followed that doctrine; the architect has found immunity
in his share.30 In the well known case of Geare v. Sturgis3l in which a
building collapsed and killed a third person, the architect and the con-
tractor were held not liable on the ground that no privity of contract ex-
isted between them and the person killed. One additional influential fac-
tor was that the building had been accepted by the owner and was there-
fore under the owner's maintenance and control. In Curtin v. Summer-
set,32 the court said that the consequences of holding opposite to the rule
requiring privity of contract would be far reaching.
If one who erects a house or builds a bridge . . . owes a duty to the
whole world that his work ... contains no hidden defects, it is difficult
to measure the extent of his responsibility and no prudent man would
engage in such occupations upon such conditions. 33
There are a number of cases involving an architect's contractual liabil-
ity to the owner that have indicated that an owner does not waive his
rights against the architect as a result of having accepted a building as
a completed structure.34
OVERTHROW OF PRIVITY
In all natural evolution the extension of the effects of some particular
individual change in a chain of events can be almost limitless. Thus it
is that the effects of Glanzer v. Shepard,35 in which a weigher of beans
was found liable to a buyer despite the absence of a contractual relation-
ship between them, were felt throughout the genes of liability to third
persons in all areas; its effect is even now being visited upon architects
and engineers. The court held that no privity of contract is necessary for
30. May v. Howell, 32 Del. 221, 121 Atl. 650 (1923); 76 SOL. J. 556 (1932);
76 SOL. J. 666 (1932); 76 SOL. J. 829 (1932); 73 SOL. J. 744 (1929); 164 LT.
78-9 (1927); see also nn. 11 & 27 supra.
31. 14 F.2d 256 (D.C. Cir. 1926).
32. 140 Pa. 70, 21 Ad. 244 (1891).
33. Id. at 80, 21 Atl. at 245; see also City of Daytona Beach v. Gannett 253 F.2d
771 (5th Cir. 1958); Pancoast v. Russell, 148 Cal. App.2d 906, 307 P.2d 719
(1957); Bay Shore Development Co. v. Bonfoey, 75 Fla. 455, 78 So. 507 (1918);
City of Carrollton v. Ayers, 211 Ga. 728, 88 S.E.2d 368 (1955); State ex rel. Na-
tional Surety Corp. v. Malvaney, 221 Miss. 190, 72 So.2d 424 (1954); School Dis-
trict v. Josenhans, 88 Wash. 624, 153 Pac. 326 (1915).
34. Breaux v. Laird, 230 La. 221, 88 So.2d 33 (1956); Galvin v. Keane, 100
Ohio App. 100, 135 N.E.2d 769 (1954). For additional cases involving privity in
architect's contracts, see Spencer v. Beatty Safway Scaffold Co., 141 Cal. App.2d 875,
297 P.2d 746 (1956); Palmer v. Brown, 127 Cal. App.2d 44, 273 P.2d 306(1954); Smith v. Goff, 325 P.2d 1061 (Okla. 1958); White v. Pallay, 119 Ore.
97, 247 Pac. 316 (1926); Hill v. Polar Pantries, 219 S.C. 263, 64 S.E.2d 885(1951); Avent v. Proffitt, 109 S.C. 48, 95 S.E. 134 (1918).
35. 233 N.Y. 236,135 N.E. 275 (1922).
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liability. The principle was adopted that one who follows a common
calling, and who serves another, may come under a duty to a second party,
even though a third party may give the order or make payment.
With that beginning, cases arose which attempted to find liability to
third persons. A pattern in the cases began to appear indicating an
awareness that there is no visible reason for the distinction between the
liability of one who supplies a chattel and one who erects a structure.38 A
number of cases have reached this conclusionm A recent case, Inman v.
Binghamton Housing Authority,8 spells out the prevailing attitude.
While holding that the architect was not liable, the court said that the
doctrine that holds a manufacturer of an inherently dangerous chattel,
defectively made, liable to remote users, is applicable to those who plan
and put up structures on real property.
A Pennsylvania court said:
There is no reason to believe that the law governing liabilities should
be, or is, in any way different where real structures are involved instead
of chattels. The principle inherent in the MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co. case and those that have followed it cannot be made to depend upon
the merely technical distinction between a chattel and a structure built
upon the land.3 9
In cases dealing with the manufacturer's liability to remote users, the
stress has always been upon the duty of guarding against hidden defects
and of giving notice of concealed dangers. In the Inman case, because
there was no suggestion that the structure possessed a latent defect or an
unknown danger, liability of the architect was not found. Different plead-
ings might have yielded the opposite result.
More recently in United States v. Rogers & Rogers,40 a contractor
sued the architect for negligence in supervision in that the architect al-
legedly negligently construed and interpreted reports of tests on concrete
and he then negligently approved structures made of that concrete when
he should have known that the specifications were not being met. The
36. PRossaa, TORTS 517 (2d ed. 1955).
37. Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, Gichner Iron
Work, Inc. v. Hanna, 351 U.S. 989 (1956); Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel
Co., 166 F.2d 908 (3d Cir. 1948); Hale v. Depoali, 33 Cal.2d 228, 201 P.2d 1
(1948); DelGaudio v. Ingerson, 142 Conn. 564, 115 A.2d 665 (1955); Hunter
v. Quality Homes, 45 Del. 100, 68 A.2d 620 (1949); Colbert v. Holland Furnace
Co., 333 Ill. 78, 164 N.E. 162 (1928); Berg v. Otis Elevator Co., 64 Utah 518, 231
Pac. 832 (1924); Colton v. Foulkes, 259 Wis. 142, 47 N.W.2d 901 (1951); see
also REsTATEMENT, TORTS § 385 (1934); 2 HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAW o
TORTS 1556 (1956); Annot., 13 A.L.12d 191 (1955).
38. 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895 (1957).
39. Foley v. Pittsburgh-DesMoines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 34, 68 A.2d 517, 533 (1949).
40. 161 F. Supp. 132 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
1959]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
court stated that California courts no longer followed the common law
rule that privity of contract must exist in order for negligent perform-
ance of the contractual duty to give rise to liability for damage to an
intangible economic interest. Quoting from another case,41 the court
said:
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be liable
to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves the
balancing of various factors among which are the extent to which the
transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, foreseeability of harm to
him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, closeness
of the connection between the defendant's conduct to injuries suffered,
the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct and the policy of
preventing future harm.
The court in the Rogers case also said:
Considerations of reason and policy impel the conclusion that the posi-
tion and authority of the supervising architect are such that he ought to
labor under the duty to the prime contractor to supervise the project with
due care under the circumstances, even though his sole contractual relation-
ship is with the owner.... The power of the architect to stop the work
alone is tantamount to a power of economic life or death over the con-
tractor. It is only just that such authority exercised in such a relation-
ship carry commensurate legal reponsibility.
The architect's status as an independent contractor would bring him
under this now generally accepted doctrine: If a thing constructed is in-
herently or eminently dangerous, or if the contractor's act results in creat-
ing a danger, the probable consequences of which would be injury to
persons, other than the owner, who may come in contact with the struc-
ture, the liability of the contractor for the consequences of his negligent
act is not limited to the owner but extends as well to any third person
not a trespasser who receives injury or damage as a direct result of such
act.
4 2
In Day v. National-U. S. Radiator Corp.,43 an architect was held liable
in damages for the fatal injury of a workman who was killed as a result
of a boiler explosion. It was alleged that the explosion occurred because
the architect had improperly and negligently supervised the job. Although
it was conceded that the subcontractor was guilty of gross negligence in
the installation of the hot water system to which the boiler was attached,
the architect was found liable because he had not noted the improper
connection during his supervisory inspections.
41. Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958); see Peek v.
Richmond Elementary School District, 326 P.2d 860 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958);
Hoehn v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 248 Minn. 162, 79 N.W.2d 19 (1956);
Dow v. Holly Mfg. Co., 49 Cal.2d 720, 321 P.2d 736 (1958).
42. Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 233 (1955).
43. No. 59, 697, Div. D., 19th Dist. Ct., La., in Stearman, Court Rulings Extend
Engineers' Liabilities, AMERIcAN ENGINEER, Feb. 1959, p. 11.
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Of all the architect's duties, that portion which involves supervision
is probably the least understood by courts and attorneys, and is also the
area out of which most litigation will arise. This is the gray area of
judgement, as exemplified by the National-U. S. Radiator case. How
closely may an architect be expected to inspect the work in progress?
What are the physical tolerances that can be used as a measure of his
legal duty? The necessity for each case to be decided on the basis of its
own facts is well recognized; there are, however, some generalizations
that can be made with regard to the term "supervision."
As in most areas of misunderstanding, the roots of the weed are
firmly embedded in the definitions and accepted uses of the word.
Supervision, as is usually explained in a cursory fashion in the owner-
architect contract, does not mean daily superintendence of the work.
Where the latter is required, special provisions are made for a paid repre-
sentative of the owner to be present on the job site during all working
hours. In the ordinary instance, however, no such elaborate arrange-
ments are made. The architect stops at the job site at various intervals,
the frequency of which is determined both by the contractor's need for
interpretation of the plans and specifications, and the owner's need for
his interests to be protected in that the plans and specifications must be
accurately followed. These job visits may occur each day at one stage of
the construction, and each week at another stage.
Who can say what error or omission by the contractor might cause
future injury to a third party and which a reasonable architect might
miss, even with daily inspections? Can the architect be held liable for
latent defects which cause injury and which he was not astute enough to
be able to predict during his supervisory visits? Clearly, these are ques-
tions that must be answered by the courts in the future. Some pattern
may have 'begun to take shape, -but it is unlikely that attorneys will have
an established guide in this area of "supervision" for some time to come.
PROFESSlONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE
A further development in this now rapidly increasing extension of
architects' and engineers' liability to third persons is the initiative taken by
the professional societies in making insurance available for the protection
of architects and engineers. Both the American Institute of Architects and
the National Society of Professional Engineers have arranged for insur-
ance policies prepared especially for these two professions. Standing com-
mittees of these societies engaged in a comprehensive study of professional
liability insurance as it might apply to architects and to engineers in
private practice. These studies were carried out over a period of several
years, culminating in 1957 with a notification of each member of the
19591
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availability of professional liability insurance and the reasons for its
need. The following statement was made by the chairman of the A. I. A.
professional liability committee: 44
... the committee set about to develop a policy form which would pro-
vide the maximum protection for the architectural and engineering pro-
fessions . . . when the new policy was finally written it accurately re-
flected the wishes of the committee and in many parts the wording sug-
gested by the committee.
Similar statements by officials of the N.S.P.E. complete the professional
sanction.
The coverage in these policies is not limited to bodily injury or
property damage caused by the accident; full coverage is provided for ex-
penses of defendants in addition to the limit of indemnity; coverage is
available for past errors, omissions and negligent acts. 45 Very likely
courts and juries will be influenced by the knowledge that this insurance
exists, and in line with the general policy of spreading the financial
burden for injury over more people, it would seem that third party lia-
bility suits will increase in the area of professional engineering and archi-
tecture just as it has in other areas.
FuTuRE TRENDS
The tremendous increase in population of the United States in the
past several years and the promise of its continued increase in the future
is indicative of an increasing amount of construction work that will be
performed. The construction industry has resisted automation rather ef-
fectively and will probably continue to do so, thus indicating that the
number of construction employees will increase rather than decrease.
With greater numbers of architects and engineers, there will undoubtedly
be more and more possibilities for negligence to occur. The effect of
the licensing laws on the competence of the architects and engineers will,
of course, be felt; it is folly, however, to expect that negligence can be
reduced simply on the basis of professional people having met a particu-
lar minimum standard required by a license law, even though that stand-
ard be raised.
When an injury does occur, it seems proper that even though it arises
out of an error in judgement rather than negligence, the one who is injured
should have redress against the one whose error in judgement caused the
injury. This general trend must be accepted in a world in which oppos-
ing ideologies are vying for leadership in giving benefits to the citizenry.
44. Smay, A New Look at Professional Liability Insurance, Journal of the Ameri-
can Institute of Architects, Dec. 1957.
45. See Professional Liability Policy Form, Continental Casualty Co., Chicago, Ill.
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It must be expected that a private enterprise economy that is seeking
ways to meet the collectivist challenge, will indeed spread the financial
burden and the risk so that individual standards may -be elevated without
the onerous raising of arms in supplication to a paternal government.
The method of equalizing the burden through insurance seems to be
working well in that regard.
It is interesting to note that the liability of other professional people
to third persons has long since been recognized. The accountants, for
example, whose financial statements are generally used by third persons,
have -been in third party liability litigation over many years. 46 The gen-
eral rule is that third parties may recover from public accountants on the
ground of fraud but not on the ground of negligence. The fact that
third party losses resulting from auditors' negligence are normally of a
financial nature seems to have some influence on the decisions. In the
case of an architect or an engineer where personal injury and death can
occur as a result of the architect's negligence, it seems the stringency
should have been much greater and liability should have arisen much
sooner.
A further factor worthy of consideration is the inability of the archi-
tect to once again become the Master Builder of the middle ages. The
construction of a large modern building reflects so many facets of tech-
nology that the architect, who must of necessity become involved in them,
finds it increasingly difficult if not a virtual impossibility to maintain
competence in them all. The architect hires specialists in these areas -
engineers for structural, acoustical and mechanical design - but even
though the responsibility might extend to these sub-agents, the architect
remains the supervisor and must of necessity protect himself accordingly.
Further, this ever widening extension of the architect's duties indicates
the increased possibilities in the future of an error in judgement which
might result in injury to a workman, or an occupant of the building.
These factors all point to an assuredly increasing tendency to find
architects and engineers liable for injuries to third parties resulting from
professional negligence.
As an epilogue to the drama, it seems discreet to consider the possi-
bility of a lowering of professional standards through the medium of
increased liability. Time was when a professional man was thought of
not only as a master in 'his particular area of knowledge, but also as a
man of stature to his clients and to the public in general. If he is to be
held increasingly responsible for his errors in judgement, then the one
time exalted status of the professional man is reduced to that of any
46. Beaver, The Auditor's Legal Liability to Third Parties, 7 WEST. Ras. L. REV.
145 (1956).
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